INTRODUCTION
The security plans for many Department of Energy (DOE) facilities require the monitoring of pedestrians and vehicles to control the movement of special nuclear material (SNM). Vehicle monitors often provide the outermost barrier against the theft of SNM. The world's political situation has created a pressing need to prevent the diversion of SNM from the former Soviet Union nuclear facilities and across international borders. 
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. proliferation deterrent if their HEU sensitivity can be improved to a sufficient level. The ' goal of this project was to evaluate more complex detector configurations as a means of improving the sensitivity of these instruments to achieve a vehicle monitor that is economical, practical to install, and has adequate sensitivity to be an effective barrier to illegal transportation of SNM. 
BACKGROUND

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
The variation in sensitivity due to the gamma-ray shielding of vehicle components can be reduced by placing more detectors around the vehicle. In addition to the standard side detectors, we added detectors above and below the vehicle. The detector configuration is shown in Figure 4 . The scintillation detectors used were all a standard size, 79-cm long, 15-cm wide, and 3.8 I-cm thick. Each pillar in the configuration contains two detectors.
The repines of each detector were setup so that their S/~B values for a standard HEU source were in good agreement. S is the counts per second minus background, B, achieved when the HEU is placed on each detector. These measurements were performed in a background of 20 to 25 #R. This configuration is essentially adding one of the normal side pillars above and below the vehicle. The two side pillars were treated as one detector group and were spaced 4.47 meters apart. The overhead detector was positioned at 3.66 meters above the ground. The lower detector was placed on the pavement surface , and aluminum ramps were used to pass over the detector. The SNM source used in these measurements was a 1061 g HEU metallic right cylinder with a diameter of 4.1 cm. This source with a 93% 235Uenrichment and less than 0.25% impurities corresponds to 987 grams of 23sU. This is an SNM source having the maximum self attenuation of its emitted radiation. The source was placed at three different locations in the vehicle and the vehicle was moved through the monitor in steps of 0.5 meters. The response of the two sides, the overhead, and the lower detectors was recorded at each position. This data was used to simulate the vehicle passage response of each monitor component. Calculations were then performed to determine the minimum detected count rates for which the individual and combinations of monitor components achieve a 0.50 or greater detection probability at a nuisance alarm rate of less than 0.001.
The corresponding minimum detectable masses were then calculated. Since the mean-free path of 186-keV photons in uranium metal is 0.04 cm, the gamma emission rate is assumed to be proportional to the surface area of the cylinder in the calculation. .
EXPERIMENTAL DATA
The occupancy background suppression profile for the three individual detector groups is shown in Figure 5 . The lower detector has the largest background suppression because it is closest to the vehicle. Since all the subsequent data was taken with the source inside the vehicle, the occupancy background suppression is reflected in all the data.
The response of the three detector groups varied dramatically for the three source positions inside the vehicle. An example of this variation is shown in Figure 6 . These 
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Figure 5. The occupancy suppression profiles for the three detector groups. The summary of all the measurement and calculations is presented in Figure 7 and Table 1 . The key to interpreting the data is to find the largest minimum detectable mass for each detector configuration at any source position in the vehicle. For the commercially available portal, which is the side detectors only, this value is 1 kg of HEU when the source is placed below the engine block. While the lower detector has very high sensitivity for the positions A and B, its worse case sensitivity is 1.5 kg at position C. The overhead detector has reasonable sensitivity for positions A and C but its sensitivity when the source was below the engine block was so poor that the 1kg mass did not yield positive count rates and, therefore, the detectable mass could not be determined. The most sensitive combination is, as expected, the sum of all three detector groups. This is true not just bixause this configuration has the maximum number of detectors, but because the detector positions compliment each other. The worst case for the side and overhead detectors, below the engine block, is the highest sensitivity for the lower detector. Similarly, the side and overhead detectors have high sensitivity for the lower detector's worst case, above the engine block Another important feature of this data is that summing certain detector groups is actually detrimental to the sensitivity. 
CONCLUSION
The original portal design of two side pillars is more sensitive than just the lower detector or just the overhead detector. The addition of the overhead detector to the side detectors does not increase the worse-case sensitivity. Summing the count rates of the side and lower detectors decreases the minimum detectable mass from 1.0 kg to 0.2 kg.
However, the best performance is achieved when all three detector groups are summed.
This cordlguration reduces the worst-case minimum detectable mass to 160 g. The difference in sensitivity between the vehicle monitoring station and the commercially available drive-through vehicle monitor is a factor of 25. If the lower and overhead detectors are added this is reduced to a factor of 5. This sensitivity is measured in an arbitrary laboratory environment to determine the relative sensitivities of the different detector configurations. The sensitivity at any nuclear facility would depend on the operational environment. Thus, this new detector configuration improves the sensitivity of the drive-through vehicle monitor by more than a factor of 5 while not changing the nuisance alarm rate. .
